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 In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took control of Xinjiang from the Koumintang 
(KMT ) and declared that Xinjiang was to be an autonomous region in 1955. However, major 
decisions were still made by the CCP led by the Han Chinese and not the Uyghurs from 
Xinjiang. The CCP implemented aggressive assimilation policies in the 1960s especially 
during the Cultural Revolution during which the Uyghurs were subjected to serious abuses. In 
1978, Deng Xiaoping took over the leadership of China after the demise of Mao Zedong. It 
brought about dramatic changes in the human rights situation in China. These included 
freedom for the Uyghurs to practice their religion, culture and language. Hence, there was an 
improvement in human rights in Xinjiang. However, in the late 1990s the CCP reverted to 
harsh policies once again. This study examines the internal and external factors that have 
influenced China‟s policies on the human rights condition in Xinjiang. The aim of this study 
is to analyse the changes in the human rights condition in Xinjiang under the different 
administrations and the factors that have caused the changes. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper examines the internal and external factors that have influenced China‟s 
policies on the human rights condition in Xinjiang. The objective of this paper is to analyse 
several pertinent issues regarding human rights in Xinjiang, particularly the role of internal 
and external factors The paper focuses on the timeframe between 1978 and 2007 because 
during this period there was an improvement in the human rights condition in Xinjiang after 
Mao Zedong‟s repressive policies such as the Cultural Revolution. It was during Deng 
Xiaoping‟s administration when the People‟s Republic of China demonstrated an interest in 
human rights by ratifying many international human rights treaties and became a member of 
Human Rights Commission in 1982.
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In the late-1990s subsequent Chinese leaders like Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have 
reverted to harsh policies such as the „Strike Hard‟ policy which has worsened human rights 
conditions in Xinjiang. Besides reporting on the struggle of the Uyghurs in maintaining their 
cultural and religious identity this paper also examines the internal and external factors which 
have influenced China‟s policy towards the human rights conditions in Xinjiang. This paper 
also hopes to provide a fresh look towards research relating to minorities in China. 
 
Background of Xinjiang 
 
Xinjiang or Sinkiang is situated at the northwest of China about 4000 km from 
Beijing. Xinjiang is also the largest province in China, covering about 617, 800 square miles 
(1, 600, 000 square km) or 1/6 of the total Chinese territory. Although, Xinjiang is considered 
as one of the most isolated regions in the world, its location is in one of the most strategic 
areas in terms of China‟s security and defence as it shares its borders with eight countries. 
These countries are Mongolia and Kazakhstan to the northwest, Russia to the north, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to the west and Afghanistan, India and Pakistan (Jammu Kashmir) 
to the southwest. There are no other provinces in China that has as many international borders 
as Xinjiang. Hence Xinjiang is an important province in terms of its role in China‟s security. 
 
Ethnicity in Xinjiang can be divided into two main categories: the Turkic people who 
are natives of Xinjiang and non-Turkic people such as the Han Chinese, Russians, 
Manchurians and Indians. The Turkic people are made up of the Uyghur, Kazakh, Kirghiz, 
Uzbek and Tajik with the Uyghurs being the largest. The Uyghurs in Xinjiang are Muslims 
and they share a common heritage, language and religion with the other Turkics living in 
Central Asia. They are not confined to Xinjiang but they are scattered throughout Central Asia 
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in countries like Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and parts of Russia. The 
Turkics are the same ethnically although they may be divided politically and physically. 
 
Xinjiang is located on the ancient „Silk Road‟ which was a popular route used by 
traders and travellers such as Ibnu Batuta and Marco Polo between the East and the West. It 
became a Chinese territory during the Ching dynasty (1644-1911) in the mid-eighteenth 
century and was administered by the military. In 1884, it was declared a Chinese province and 
was the last area to be permanently occupied by China. The Ching dynasty named the 
province „Xinjiang‟ which means „New Borders‟ in Chinese.  
 
However many western explorers such as Sir Aurel Stain and Sven Hedin referred to 
the area as „Chinese Turkestan‟ or East Turkestan. Despite the fall of the Ching dynasty in 
1911, Xinjiang remained part of the Republic of China under the Koumintang Party (KMT).  
The Uyghurs who settled in the Tarim Basin, Xinjiang were introduced to the Islamic faith in 
the late 9
th
 century A.D. In fact, Islam had reached Central Asia as early the mid 7
th
 century 
A.D through Arabic merchants and Islamic teachers who used the Silk Road to travel to 
China. 
 
The local leaders in Xinjiang launched several revolts aimed at separating Xinjiang 
from Chinese rule and establishing an Islamic sultanate. However, these attempts were 
unsuccessful as they were defeated by Chinese troops. One of the most popular Turkic revolts 
against Chinese rule occurred in Xinjiang during the 19
th
 century was by Yakub Beg that 
lasted for 13 years (1864 to 1877).  
 
After the 1911 Revolution, there was a transition in the Turkic separatist movement 
because revolts were no longer organised by Muslim religious teachers but Turkic nationalist 
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who received their education in the Soviet Union (USSR). The Turkic nationalists attempted 
to separate the province from Chinese control by establishing the Turkish Islamic Republic of 
Eastern Turkistan Republic (TIRET) in 1933-34 and the East Turkestan Republic (ETR) in 
1944-1945. 
 
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took control of Xinjiang from the KMT 
and declared that Xinjiang was to be an autonomous region in 1955. Ever since then the 
province has been known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). However, 
major decisions were still made by the CCP led by the Han Chinese and not the locals from 
Xinjiang. The CCP implemented aggressive assimilation policies in the 1960s especially 
during the Cultural Revolution during which the locals were subjected to serious abuses at the 
hand of the authorities. 
 
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping took over the leadership of China after the demise of Mao 
Zedong in 1976. There was an improvement in human rights in Xinjiang. However, in the late 
1990s the CCP reverted to harsh policies once again. They declared the policy of „Strike 
Hard‟ which sanctioned the use of torture and arbitrary detentions it brought about dramatic 
changes in the human rights situation in China. 
 
According to the Census of China in 2000, the total population of Xinjiang is 
18,459,511. The Uyghurs compromised 45.5 percent and the Han compromised 40.6 percent 
with the Muslim Kazakhs at 6.7 percent of the total population of Xinjiang. The census also 
estimated that the population of Xinjiang will increase to 19.63 million by 2004.
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Human Rights Conditions in Xinjiang Prior to the 1978 Reforms 
 
The human rights conditions in Xinjiang during this period can be divided into two periods:  
 
First was between 1949 till 1959, which was considered as the „accommodative‟ years 
followed by the second which was the „repressive‟ period which started in 1960 till 1978.  In 
September 1949 the Koumintang (KMT) forces under Commander Tao Zhiyue surrendered to 
the PLA.
3
 The initial task of the PLA and CCP was to establish a new administration in the 
province by gaining internal support from the various parties including the Uyghur 
nationalists and the disbanded KMT forces. At that moment the CCP adopted a tolerant policy 
with the aim of creating a „united front‟. 
 
Gaining internal support was the major concern of the CCP during the early years of 
its administration in Xinjiang. The CCP wanted to appease the non Han peoples by granting 
autonomy to the provinces who where then the majority living; this included Xinjiang, Tibet, 
Ningxia, Kansu and Qinghai. Therefore in October 1955, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region (XUAR or Xinjiang Weiwuer zizhiqu) was established.
4
 The establishment of the 
XUAR has given the non-Hans the opportunity to govern the in the lower levels of 
administration with positions such as the chairmen of counties, districts and prefectures. 
Hence the Uyghurs during this period were enjoyed certain rights such as eligibility for 
special representation in an autonomous area, right to use their language and maintain their 
cultural and religious identity. 
 
However, the situation began to change when the CCP consolidated its position in the 
province by the mid-1950s. The CCP introduced the Land Reform policy which prohibited 
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the Islamic authorities from owning waqf lands. The lands were taken over by the government 
and later redistributed. This was part of the Marxist and Maoist development programme 
which promoted collectivisation of resources.
5
 In addition, the CCP also prohibited the 
Islamic authorities from collecting zakat and the shari’ah legal system was discontinued. 
Local leaders or ahungs were sent away to longhai or labour camps. Apart from that, the 
Xinjiang Muslims were stripped of their rights to travel; especially to go on hajj. All Muslim 
holidays which had been formerly acknowledged were withdrawn. 
 
Beginning from the 1960s, the CCP started introducing repressive policies which 
replaced the gradual and accommodative policies. Both internal and external factors have 
contributed to the change of policies. Among the internal factors were the failures of the 
„Hundred Flowers Movement‟ and the Great Leap Forward to achieve their objectives.  
 
Following the failure of the Great Leap Forward and criticism of the Hundred Flowers 
Movement in 1965, Mao Zedong wanted to reconsolidate his position in the government. He 
blamed the failure of the Great Leap Forward on party leaders who were liberal minded. In 
the following year, Mao Zedong launched the „Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution‟. It was 
a political campaign to purge all those whom he considered as „liberals‟, such as Deng 
Xiaoping.  
 
As a result Mao encouraged Chinese youths to establish militia groups known as the 
„Red Guards‟. Their aim was to monitor party members and punish those whom they 
considered as liberals. They also regarded religion and traditions or anyone associated with 
such things including academics, writers, poets, artists as feudalistic and anti-revolution who 
need to be purged and „rehabilitated‟. Very often they will be demoted, sent to longhai for 
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rehabilitation, publicly humiliated, had their houses ransacked, physically assaulted and even 
killed. 
 
In Xinjiang, the situation was not better than other provinces. Once the Red Guards 
from Beijing arrived in Xinjiang in 1966, they started to persecute local leaders including 
Wang Enmao, the First Secretary of the Xinjiang Communist Party and commander of the 
Xinjiang Military Region.
6
 He eventually was removed from these positions and transferred to 
Beijing. During the Cultural Revolution, the red guards were opposed to the policies of 
accommodation and local autonomy, therefore many Uyghurs were deprived of their jobs in 
the government. In 1962, there were 111,500 Uyghurs working for the provincial government 
holding various posts such clerks, polices, district and county chairmen. However, in 1975, 
there only 80,000 non-Hans left working in the government.
7
 
 
In addition, the CCP has always been suspicious of Islam and the Uyghur traditions 
which they considered as feudalistic and anti-revolution. Hence they were convinced that the 
influence of Islam and Uyghur traditions should be wiped out through the implementation of 
harsh policies. In addition to the Sino-Soviet rivalry, the CCP also intended to eliminate the 
Soviet influence in Xinjiang especially among the Uyghurs.  
 
The external factors included the Sino-Soviet rivalry which influenced Beijing to 
adopt harsh policies. The CCP wanted to eliminate Soviet influence in the province and the 
CCP feared the Soviet may interfere into the internal politics of Xinjiang as part of its plans to 
attack China. The CCP had increased the Chinese military presence in the province. This had 
resulted to the militarisation of Xinjiang. The aim was defend the province against any 
possible Soviet invasion at all cost. The political turmoil between China and the Soviet Union 
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encouraged the CCP to adopt repressive policies which resulted in a decline of human rights 
conditions.  
 
Internal Factors in Influencing Human Rights Conditions Xinjiang since 1978 Reforms 
 
The internal factors are characteristics that shape China‟s policy on human rights in 
Xinjiang on the domestic level.  This paper identifies three internal factors. They are the 
Chinese Communist Party‟s (CCP) perspective on human rights, the CCP‟s policies toward 
Xinjiang since 1978 and the security condition of the province which played a role in shaping 
the human rights condition in Xinjiang.  
 
This paper argues that the internal factors serve China‟s interest in Xinjiang. This 
includes territorial integrity and security of the province, protection of the Chinese Han 
presence and continuous economic development of Xinjiang. Although the Chinese 
government has granted certain rights to the minorities since the early 1980s it would do 
whatever it takes to protect its interest which includes never tolerating any secessionist 
attempts in Xinjiang. 
 
i) Chinese Communist Party (CCP)‟s Perspective on Human Rights 
 
China adopted the human rights norms not because it was convinced by them nor felt 
morally obligated to adopt them instead it was motivated by its national interest. It must be 
noted that China prefers to define human rights based its own understanding as the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP)‟s perspective on human rights plays an important role in shaping the 
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human rights condition in Xinjiang. The core elements of the CCP‟s human rights policy can 
be divided into two points.  
 
Firstly, the CCP stresses that economic development of the state should be given top 
priority at the expense of human rights. According to the CCP it is imperative that a suitable 
national condition for economic growth exists over observing and promoting any civil or 
political rights.
8
 Secondly, the CCP is convinced that human rights should be based on its 
own national characteristics which include its level of development, political systems, culture 
and history. Hence it must be made clear that the human rights condition in Xinjiang is 
influenced by the CCP‟s understanding of human rights.9 
 
The CCP started to give emphases on human rights or renquan during Deng 
Xiaoping‟s administration when the People‟s Republic of China demonstrated an interest in 
human rights by ratifying several international human rights treaties.
10
 There has been an 
improvement in the human rights condition in China when compared to Mao Zedong‟s 
repressive policies such as the Cultural Revolution. China has always argued that it is not 
against human rights norms as long as these norms serve national interest and integrity. For 
example, since the early 1980s China has granted more freedom to the minorities, such as 
granting them rights to practice their religion and culture openly.  
 
In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping shaped the CCP‟s ideas on human rights based on 
Marxism and Chinese nationalism. In fact, he openly declared that the Chinese understanding 
of human rights was different from those advocated in the West. Deng pointed out that it 
wasn‟t fair to judge China‟s human rights record based on the „western‟ values which he 
considered as biased and incompatible to Chinese values. According to Deng, “our concept of 
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human rights is in essence, different from that of the Western world, because we see the 
question from a different point of view.”11 In fact, China has been using propaganda to 
convince its fellow citizens that criticism from the international community, such as Amnesty 
International (AI) and the United States regarding its human rights records in Xinjiang or 
Tibet can be considered as interfering in their national sovereignty.  
 
Instead, China prioritises the right to peace and development as being far more 
important than human rights. Therefore, in the case of Xinjiang the stability of the province is 
crucial in ensuring its economic development to the extent of sacrificing human rights. Since 
the Deng Xiaoping‟s administration China has always argued that economic development 
supersedes human rights norms. Hence, Deng advocated the idea that „development is the 
absolute principle‟ in which the state‟s primary duty is to develop its economy. This is 
because it is only by developing its economy can a necessary material foundation be laid for a 
comprehensive guarantee of human rights.
12
 
 
Deng Xiaoping‟s ideas on human rights managed to influence the CCP and its leaders 
even after he retired from the political scene in 1992. Following his death in 1997, China still 
regarded him as the chief architect of China's economic reforms and China's socialist 
modernization. Hence subsequent leaders continued Deng‟s approach to the issues related to 
human rights although they have made some minor modifications. Deng Xiaoping‟s ideas 
have influenced the CCP leaders in Xinjiang such as Wang Enmao and Wang Lequan that the 
stability and prosperity of the province was their primary concern. Whereas, ensuring human 
rights norms being observed, was secondary. In fact if the position of the CCP was threatened 
by separatists they were willing to forsake human rights norms.  
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ii) The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)‟s Policy toward Xinjiang since 1978 
 
In 1976, the demise of Mao Zedong, marked the end of an era of ideological 
narrowness in China and ushered in a period of reorientation and restructuring based on 
economic development. New pragmatic leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang 
knew that for China to progress economically it required the support of all the minorities 
including the Hui Muslims and the Uyghurs. In Xinjiang, the CCP adopted liberal policies for 
minority nationalities with the aim of resolving the problem of ethnicity and creating a 
common identity through economic development. For example the 1978 Constitution 
emphasised the importance of national minorities. It guaranteed freedom for the minorities to 
maintain their language, customs and representation in the government.
13
    
 
It is noteworthy to mention that the primary aim of the liberalisation of policies was to 
gain the support of the Uyghurs in order to develop China‟s agriculture, industry, science and 
technology and defence. The ultimate aim was to serve China‟s national interest by providing 
some basic freedoms to the Uyghurs so as to seek their cooperation in developing Xinjiang‟s 
economy. The CCP was aware that the Han Chinese cannot achieve this without Uyghur 
support.  
 
During the Fifth National Congress of the People‟s Republic of China in 1982, the 
Constitution of the People‟s Republic of China adopted several provisions aimed at ensuring 
the basic rights of the minority nationalities.
14
 Among them was the declaration that all 
nationalities in the PRC were equal and any discrimination against any nationality was 
prohibited.  
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Subsequently in the mid-1980s, economic development in minority areas such as 
Xinjiang became a major concern of the CCP. Its aim was to integrate the economy of its 
western region with central China. The CCP has initiated several affirmative actions for the 
Uyghurs. These included financial assistances, recruitment and promotion of Uyghurs in 
government departments, admission of Uyghur youths into public schools and universities 
and improvement in the public infrastructures in areas populated by Uyghurs.  
 
The Constitution of 1982 also ensured some religious freedoms on condition that it did 
not disrupt the stability of the state. Religious sites in Xinjiang were restored and the use of 
Uyghur language in local schools was allowed. However, the schools were still government 
controlled. In 1980, the CCP of Xinjiang permitted the use of the Arabic script for the Turkic 
language
15
 and in the same year, the Xinjiang Islamic Association (XIA) was given 
permission to reintroduce the Arabic script for the Uyghur and Kazakh languages. In 1984, 
15,000 imams were trained and 150,000 copies of the Quran were published in Xinjiang.
16
  As 
a result more than 23, 000 mosques were built and Uyghurs were allowed to perform their Haj 
pilgrimage. The numbers of Haj pilgrims from China have increased from 260 in 1985 to 
2,000 in 1995. Gou Chengzhen, the Deputy Director of the Department of Muslim Affairs 
claimed in 2006 there were 7,000 Chinese Muslim performing their Haj.
17
 
 
The reform and opening-up of policies advocated by Deng Xiaoping, brought mixed 
reactions. On the one hand, the CCP placed great importance on the construction of basic 
communications, power generation and telecommunication facilities.
18
 Hence, from the 1990s 
onwards, Xinjiang enjoyed further economic development especially after the disintegration 
of the USSR. With the demise of the Soviet threat, the Chinese government was able to 
develop the northwest region and attract more foreign investments. On the other hand, 
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economic development has further contributed to the influx of Chinese Hans into the province 
and alienated the Uyghurs from mainstream development.  
 
iii) Political Violence in Xinjiang and the Uyghurs Separatism 
 
Another internal factor which influences the human rights conditions of Xinjiang is its 
security. Since the mid 1990s the outbreak of political violence has been so serious that the 
province can be considered to be in a state of emergency and human rights norms have been 
ignored. The primary concern of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been to ensure 
China‟s control and stability of the province.  
 
It is noteworthy to mention that China is even willing to adopt policies that violate 
human rights in order to subdue any secessionist attempts by the Uyghurs especially when the 
safety of the migrants Hans living in Xinjiang is threatened. The PRC administration in 
Xinjiang has been encountering opposition from the Uyghurs from the beginning. They 
considered the CCP to be a foreign entity who has taken over their homeland. Moreover they 
wanted the CCP to stop the policy of mass migration of Hans into Xinjiang. 
 
 As a result, there were several waves of rebellions against the CCP. It must be noted 
that every ten years the province will experience a major rebellion. The objectives of these 
rebellions were to separate the province from China and establish an independent republic. 
This has caused the Chinese authorities to be sceptical in granting more freedom and rights to 
the Uyghurs. They fear such actions will future enhance their demands and spirit for 
independence.     
 
14 
 
Political violence and separatist activities in the province have increased in the 1980s 
and 1990s despite some conciliatory measures which were undertaken by the CCP during the 
Deng Xiaoping administration. These have led to the revival of Islam and the Uyghur identity. 
The resurgence of Uyghur nationalism was contributed by the opening up of borders as part of 
Deng Xiaoping‟s economic reforms which tolerated religious and cultural freedom.  
 
Hence, in the late 1980s these liberal policies were halted due to the fear that Islam 
might provoke Uyghur nationalism in Xinjiang. Since the 1980s and 1990s the Uyghurs 
resistances have turned more violent by using methods such as bombings, burning down 
government buildings and the, killing of government officials. Another important feature of 
the resistance was the rise of religious militants and the use of small arms like machine guns, 
hand grenades and dynamites in their attacks. Therefore it future convinced the CCP to 
impose more stringent laws regardless of human rights norms.   
 
The struggle between the Chinese authorities and Uyghur separatists continued into 
the 2000s. The latest demonstration was on 5 July 2009 where at least 1000 Uyghurs 
protested and attacked the Han Chinese. Police attempted to quell the rioters with tear gas, 
water hoses, armoured vehicles, and roadblocks; as a result the government imposed a curfew 
in most urban areas. Two days later, on 7 July, the Han retaliated against the Uyghurs. 
According to the authorities 197 people were killed and 1,721 were injured.
 
In addition to the 
loss of lives, many vehicles and buildings were destroyed.
19
 
 
The Chinese were caught in a Catch-22 situation. This was because if they were to 
grant further freedoms to the Uyghurs, they would be more content with the government but 
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would also increased their ethnic and religious identity which leads to Uyghur separatism and 
apathy toward the Han Chinese. The crucial issue for the CCP is not whether the human rights 
conditions in Xinjiang has improved; instead ensuring the safety and security of the province 
and the Han Chinese living in Xinjiang takes precedence. 
 
External Factors in Influencing Human Rights Conditions in Xinjiang 
 
The external factors consist of issues and events that have taken place abroad that 
influences China‟s (state) policy toward human rights conditions in Xinjiang. Since the 1990s, 
several like minded states and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) such as 
the Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW) and, groups representing the 
Uyghur diasporas have published reports on human rights abuses in Xinjiang. These reports, 
and the opinions of these organisations on the human rights conditions in Xinjiang are 
believed to have influenced Beijing‟s policies towards that region.  
 
It focuses on how international issues and reports by international organisations have 
influence the development human rights in Xinjiang. In addition it analyses the human rights 
networks who are interested in the conditions in Xinjiang. They consist of state and non-state 
actors. They may differ in their approaches but they share similar objectives, which is to 
influence China to improve its human rights policy in Xinjiang.  
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i) Disintegration of the Soviet Union 
 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 enabled the five Central Asian 
republics achieve independence and helped to promote awareness regarding the Pan-Turkic 
and Islamic identity among the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The Uyghurs were envious of their 
fellow Turkics living in the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. Their envy inspired the 
Uyghurs to achieve political sovereignty and cultural autonomy in Xinjiang.  
 
The independence of the Central Asian republics and a resurgence of Islam have led to 
an increase in separatist activities by Uyghurs wanting to establish „Uyghuristan‟ in Xinjiang. 
Many of them were disappointed with the CCP as they had an impression that the 
disintegration of the USSR will led to independence or at least increased autonomy in their 
own province. Besides that the opening up of borders has increased the contacts between the 
Uyghurs and other Muslims living in Pakistan, Central Asia and the Middle East, which have 
exposed them to radical ideals.
20
  Therefore this has resulted in an increase in public criticism 
by the Uyghurs throughout the early and mid-1990s that ranged from university protests to 
ethnic and civil unrest. In spite of this, the Uyghurs living in Central Asia have established 
several political organisations to gain support for the independence of Xinjiang.   
 
The Chinese authorities responded by stepping up efforts to counter protests led by the 
Uyghurs. These efforts include making a series of arrests and new policy announcements. In 
April 1997, the „Strike Hard Maximum Pressure‟ campaign was launched. The primary aim of 
the campaign was to clamp down on crime and corruption; however the campaign was also 
used to restrict religious and political activities which were deemed as being critical of the 
CCP. This included having prayers in „illegal‟ or unregistered mosques during the fasting 
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month and organising peaceful gatherings to discuss the political and social condition of the 
province. 
 
ii) The „September 11 Attack‟ and Global War on Terror 
 
Another major external factor that has influenced the human rights conditions in 
Xinjiang is the global war on terror. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the 
United States, the Chinese government made use of the tragic attacks to blame the Uyghurs 
solidarity groups as part of Al Qaeda.  
  
It is important to note that prior to the September 11 attacks, the Chinese government 
denied the involvement of external terrorist groups in the separatist movement in Xinjiang. 
Chinese propaganda has always painted the Xinjiang separatists as an internal problem and 
did not require any foreign interference. However, since the September 11 attacks, Beijing has 
initialised its own war on terrorism. They accused the Uyghurs groups of having connections 
with Osama bin Laden‟s global terrorist network to flight for an independent East Turkestan. 
They even blamed the actions of the separatist movements in Xinjiang during the 1990s as 
„terrorist activities‟. 
 
This has resulted in an increase in the crackdown of armed separatist group, non-
aggressive Uyghur solidarity groups and all Muslims living in Xinjiang whom they suspect as 
terrorists. On 21 January 2002, the Chinese government declared that “terrorist forces in 
Eastern Turkestan would not escape punishment.”21 On 1 February 2002 the Xinhua News 
agency announced that the Chinese authorities had identified 50 terrorist organisations in 
18 
 
Xinjiang whereas previously it has never admitted that the province was facing any threat 
from terrorist groups.
22
 Since January 2002 the Chinese has even organised exhibitions in 
major cities of Xinjiang to demonstrate to its people and foreigners that the Uyghur groups are 
linked to terrorist networks.
23
   
 
China made use of the incident to increase penalties on those found guilty of being in 
any way „connected to terrorist organisations‟. AI reported that in March 2002 the repression 
in Xinjiang has intensified. According to the AI report the Chinese authorities has imposed 
new restrictions in Xinjiang, especially on the Islamic religion, by closing down „illegal‟ 
mosques and subjecting Uyghur Muslim religious teachers to close scrutiny and „political 
education‟.24 Repressive policies were also targeted on all opposition activities in the province 
including peaceful expression of views via pamphlets, books, magazines, speeches, songs, 
poems and the internet. 
 
 
 
iii) Transnational Human Rights Network on Xinjiang 
 
The outbreak of violence in Xinjiang and human rights abuses in the 1990s led to the 
formation and mobilisation of domestic opposition, which were interested in promoting 
human rights norms and in linking up with international groups. It also brought about the 
development of international solidarity groups on Xinjiang thus moving the issue to a new 
phase of internationalisation. Other than the non-governmental organisations, there are also 
pressures from like-minded states such as the United States to take a harder stand on China in 
regards to its human rights policies. 
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The human rights network on Xinjiang can be generally divided into three major 
categories consisting of international non-governmental organisations, inter-governmental 
organisations and like-minded states such as the United States and Turkey. They may differ in 
their approaches but have expressed deep concerns about the sequence of serious human 
rights violations which occurred in Xinjiang and are working to pressure China to improve its 
human rights policies. 
 
The international non-governmental organisations are human rights solidarity groups 
established by both the Uyghur Diasporas such as the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) and 
the Uyghur American Association and non-Uyghurs Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch and Human Rights in China. It must be noted that not all of them advocate the 
independence of Xinjiang but they have committed themselves to work for civil, political, 
social and economic human rights of the peoples of Xinjiang as well as the right of self-
determination and of the integrity of the environment. It is also important to mention that 
most of them do not condone acts of terrorism and violence in order to achieve their aims. 
 
It should be mentioned that Rebiya Kadeer
25
 has also played an important role in 
internationalising the plight of the Uyghurs and seeking international pressure on China. The 
detention of Rabiya Kadeer received international attention. The AI and Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) publicised her case and campaigned for her release. In 2000, the HRW awarded 
Rabiya Kadeer with its highest human rights award. Similarly, in 2004, the Norwegian Rafto 
Foundation awarded her the Rafto Award.
26
 Finally, after four years of international 
campaigning, she was released on 17 March 2005, three days prior to the official visit by 
Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State to Beijing. She was granted permission to go to 
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the US in order to be with her husband. However, her children were not allowed to leave the 
country. In fact two of her sons, Alim and Ablikim Abdulreyim have been sentenced to jail 
for „crimes against the state‟.  
  
It should be noted that despite China being a major power, it does give in to 
international pressure in order to maintain its position and for it own interests.   Since her 
release in 2005, Rabiya Kadeer has been actively campaigning for the human rights of the 
Uyghurs. Rabiya Kadeer has travelled abroad to meet with heads of state and leaders of non-
governmental organisations as part of her effort to internationalise the plight of her people. In 
July 2008, on the eve of the Beijing Olympics, Rabiya Kadeer met with President George W. 
Bush at the White House with four other human rights leaders to discuss the human rights 
situation in China.
27
 President Bush has expressed his concern for the Uyghurs‟ quest for 
human rights and he said he would raise the human rights issues with the Chinese leaders 
during his visit to Beijing. According to Rabiya Kadeer, President Bush had specifically 
expressed concern regarding the detention of her sons. Kadeer said “his decision to meet with 
us at this time will send a powerful message to the Chinese government that it does not have a 
free hand to commit human rights abuses.”28 In fact she had previously met with President 
Bush in Prague in June 2007 where he delivered a speech at a conference on democracy. 
During his speech President Bush praised her as a defender of human rights.  
 
Similarly, in November 2007, Rabiya Kadeer was invited by the US Congress to 
address the Congressional Human Rights Caucus (CHRC) regarding the problem of Uyghur 
women trafficking in Xinjiang. The CHRC was co-chaired by Congressman Tom Lantos and 
Congressman Frank R. Wolf. Rabiya was able to gain the attention from some representatives 
who were present.
29
 Among them was Ambassador Mark P. Lagon, Director of the Office to 
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Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons at the US State Department. Ambassador Lagon 
acknowledged the problems faced by the young Uyghur women mentioned by Rabiya Kadeer. 
Representative Chris Smith of New Jersey was critical towards the Chinese policies that seek 
to assimilate the Uyghur by force. In 2007, Rebiya Kadeer the president of WUC was the 
recipient of the Congressional Gold Medal. This demonstrates that the WUC has been able to 
attract attention from the US Congress in their struggle for human rights in Xinjiang.
30
  
 
The United States has also expressed its concern over the human rights conditions in 
Xinjiang. The US has been actively campaigning for the plight of the Uyghurs since the 
1990s. The US State Department has released several reports on the human rights conditions 
in Xinjiang, but the Chinese government has categorically denied the allegations of human 
rights abuses mentioned in these reports. However, the reports have caused international 
embarrassment for the Chinese and they were made aware that the ways they treat the Muslim 
minorities are being monitored by the international community. On 17 September 2007, the 
US House of Representatives passed House Resolution 497 by a voice vote; this resolution 
demanded that the Chinese government release the children of Rebiya Kadeer and Huseyin 
Celil, a Canadian citizen.
31
  
 
Since the 1990s, American presidents have made a point to meet with several Uyghur 
leaders in Washington DC as part of the US effort to demonstrate its solidarity to the Uyghur 
community. For example, President Clinton and President Bush invited Uyghurs leaders to 
the White House to discuss conditions in Xinjiang. Among them were Rabiya Kadeer and 
Anwar Yusof.
32
 Although the meetings triggered protests from the Chinese government, 
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Washington wanted to signal that the US is concerned with the plight of the Uyghurs and it 
may consider imposing sanctions against China if the condition worsened.      
 
In the aftermath of the July Riots, 2009, the US State Department has again expressed 
concerns over the human rights conditions in Xinjiang. It has called on the Chinese authorities 
to practice restraint and be transparent in its trials on those who were detained during the riots. 
Philip Crowley the spokesman of the US State Department said “the US will continue to urge 
China to handle their detention and judicial processes in a more transparent manner.”33 
 
It is important to note that since September 11 tragic events the US State Department 
has adopted a „dual‟ policy regarding the Xinjiang issue. Its counter-terrorism office has been 
sympathetic toward China‟s position. It has even praised China for taking actions against 
terrorism and separatism. Although the US has warned Beijing not to use the 11 September 
incidents to persecute the Uyghurs
34
, it has succumbed to the Chinese persuasion and listed 
the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) on its list of terrorist groups.
35
 This was a 
positive point for China as it provides international support for the Chinese to adopt harsh 
policies in the name of security and counter terrorism. It has also welcomed China‟s action to 
impose sanction on the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party
36
whom the Chinese authorities alleged 
as being part of the Al Qaeda network. The human rights section of the US State Department, 
on the other hand, continued to condemn discrimination and human rights abuses in 
Xinjiang.
37
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Conclusion 
 
This paper has shown that during Deng Xiaoping‟s administration in the 1980s, the 
CCP emphasised human rights or renquan when the People‟s Republic of China demonstrated 
interest in human rights by ratifying international human rights treaties.
38
 Therefore the 
human rights conditions in most parts of China improved, including Xinjiang, when compared 
to the Cultural Revolution period during Mao Zedong‟s administration. It is essential to note 
that since the early 1980s, the CCP has amended some of its harsh policies in Xinjiang in 
order to gain the support and cooperation of the Uyghurs.     
  
This paper has found that China prefers to define human rights based its own 
understanding. It is noteworthy to mention that it has always argued that it is not against 
human rights norms as long as these norms serve the national interest and integrity. However, 
international human rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and like-minded states 
such as the United States and other western European states have condemned China for not 
practicing human rights in accordance to their interpretation.  
 
The Chinese government has acknowledged international criticism against its human 
rights policies although it refuses to admit these allegations. The primary concern of China is 
its image, therefore it has adopted propaganda strategies such as publishing white papers like 
the White Paper on Human Rights in China, White Paper on History, Development of 
Xinjiang, White Paper on Freedom of Religious Belief in China which aimed at informing and 
educating the cadres, masses as well as providing justification to the international community 
on the human rights condition. 
 
24 
 
In view of this, China will most likely continue to defend its rule in Xinjiang at all 
costs even to the extent of violating international human rights norms. With the number of 
Hans almost equalling the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, China will surely not let Xinjiang be 
independent. It can be safely concluded that in the next two decades or so, the number of 
Hans would have surely outnumbered the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, thereby making this province 
more Chinese and less Uyghur. Hence, with the passage of time and the influx of more Hans, 
Xinjiang would surely resemble a typical Chinese province such that perhaps one day nothing 
would be Uyghur about Xinjiang!  
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